




Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS) Vol. 1, No. 1-2, 2015 
 
 
Cost efficiency of banks in Croatia 
 
Ivan Huljak 
Croatian National Bank, Zagreb, Croatia, ivan.huljak@hnb.hr 
 
Abstract 
Foreign and larger banks in Croatia are generally considered to be more cost 
efficient compared with domestic and smaller banks. However, those views are 
often based on data from financial statements that can be misleading due to 
simultaneous consolidation process on the market and the existence of economies 
of scale. To contribute to the Croatian banking efficiency literature, we construct a 
panel of individual bank data for 1994-2014 period and conduct a frontier analysis to 
calculate bank specific X-efficiency. Our results suggest that efficiency scores 
depend on the cost definition as domestic and smaller banks are more efficient in 
managing administrative costs compared with foreign and larger banks but equally 
efficient in managing total costs. Results indicate that average bank relative 
efficiency increased on two occasions: one in the late 90s in the period of banking 
crisis and subsequent "market cleansing" and to a lesser extent in the period marked 
with financial crisis. Although the differences between bank cost efficiencies seem 
small, we conclude that the area is worth further research as significant gains in bank 
earnings could be achieved by increasing efficiency. 
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Data from financial statements suggests that the efficiency of banking sector in 
Croatia increased in the last 20 years. Indeed, banks were able to collect 
significantly more deposits per unit of labour used and in the same time increase 
asset per employee. Together this decreased cost to income ratio, which is often 
used for bank efficiency approximation (Figure 1). It is also often believed that the 
entrance of foreign owners led to bank efficiency increase as know-how in cost 
management started to transfer from foreign owners to newly acquired banks. The 
data shows that standard aggregate efficiency indicators all record constant 
improvements after the entrance of foreign investors. However, the entrance of 
foreign players on the market increased market concentration, which stimulated 
standard efficiency indicators due to economies of scale. Therefore, efficiency gains 
observed through indicators from financial statements could to a large extent be 
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independent on bank ownership structure or bank size (Figure 1). Therefore, it could 
be the case that the efficiency of banks did not improve over time, and that the 
financial crisis did not cause banks to be more efficient, it simply speeded up the 
process of consolidation on the market. In addition, the data from financial 
statements does not allow for conclusions about real (empirical) bank efficiency as it 
cannot control for bank size or the prices bank has to pay on the market. 
Considering that empirical indicators are rather data consuming and technically 
challenging to calculate researchers often use various approaches with rather 
inconsistent results. Therefore, a significant part of economic practice approaches 
the question of bank efficiency with caution and the question of bank efficiency is 
often sidelined in research, especially in CEE countries where data quality was until 
recently one of the constraints for researching this area.  
In the Croatian banking context, researchers have examined issues of bank 
efficiency often in context of specific historic periods marked with privatisation, 
ownership transfer or regulatory changes. Kraft and Tirtoroglu (1998) used Stochastic 
Frontier Approach on 1994 and 1995 data to estimate efficiencies for old vs. new 
and state vs. private banks. They concluded that new banks seem to be more X-
inefficient and more scale-inefficient than either old privatized banks or old state 
banks. However, authors emphasize that the relationship between profitability and 
efficiency between banks in Croatia is statistically weak. Jemrić and Vujčić (2002) 
used Data Envelopment analysis to conclude that (between 1995 and 2000) foreign-
owned banks are on average more efficient compared with domestic banks and 
that new banks are more efficient than old ones. Authors also find strong 
equalization in terms of average efficiency in the Croatian banking market, both 
between peer groups and within peer groups of banks. Kraft, Payne and Hofler 
(2006) used a flexible Fourier cost function to show that new and privatized banks 
are not necessarily the most efficient in the period from 1994-2000. In addition, 
according to their results, privatisation does not seem to be influencing cost 
efficiency of banks. However, higher cost efficiency is connected with lower bank 
default probability. Finally, Arisis (2010) in cross-country study and Huljak (2015) in 
country level study calculated cost efficiency of banks in Croatia to find evidence of 
Quiet-life hypothesis: market power having a negative, although economically 
weak, influence on bank efficiency.  
The motive of this research is to calculate empirical efficiency of banks in Croatia, 
but also to provide more explanation on the methodology and perhaps clear some 
of the reasons why research done so far resulted in inconsistent results. In addition, 
the data set is relatively long, and enables putting the efficiency results in economic 
and historical context and observe bank efficiency over the business cycle. 
Therefore, we contribute to the literature on bank efficiency in Croatia by 
calculating an empirical measure of bank efficiency for the period 1994-2014, which 
gives us the opportunity to compare the results with some earlier work on this matter 
but also test some of the “common knowledge” on this subject. 
This paper is organized as follows: After introduction, literature overview and 
traditional aggregate indicators of bank efficiency in Croatia in Section 1, Section 2 
explains the data and the methodology. Section 3 displays and elaborates the 
results, while Section 4 concludes.  
 
Data and methodology 
The groundwork for firm-level efficiency measurement was laid by Farrell (1957), who 
provided useful information on how to define firm efficiency as a concept, and how 
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developed later on by Leibenstein (1966) while questioning the assumptions in 
postulating non-allocative type of efficiency within firm. Eventually, he showed that 
firms were neither always internally efficient nor always maximizing their profits 
because of inherent inefficiency that is not of allocative nature and which was 
called X-efficiency (XE).  
Over the years, two main approaches were developed for firm efficiency 
calculation: parametric and non-parametric with the difference being that 
parametric methods assume functional form of the frontier up front, while non-
parametric methods use linear programming techniques and assume that random 
error equals zero, neglecting the importance of specification of the individually best 
practice frontier. Since only parametric models allow for hypothesis testing, more 
recent literature is more inclined to parametric models. To minimize the problem of 
confusing inefficiencies from random error, parametric models usually estimate a 
transcendental log function that allows returns to scale to change with input or 
output proportions so that the estimated cost curve can have a familiar U-shape. 
However, within the parametric approach the assumption on the distribution of 
random errors has to be made for which purpose researchers usually chose between 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and Distribution Free Approach (DFA). SFA 
determines the functional form for the cost, inputs and prices up front and by using 
this approach; researchers accept that inefficiencies are half-normally distributed, 
while errors have a normal distribution. DFA on the other hand separates the 
inefficiencies from random errors in a different way, as it makes no strong assumption 
about regarding their distribution. 
The application of the frontier methods on banking sector was to a large extent 
pioneered by Berger (1993) who calculated the XE for United States banks by utilizing 
a Distribution free approach (DFA) under the assumption that banks efficiencies are 
relatively stable over time. In addition, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) indicated 
that X-inefficiencies in bank industry account for more than 20 percent of all banking 
costs, while scale and scope efficiencies together make up to 5 percent. We follow 
Berger and Hannan (1998) who used DFA to calculate bank XE by measuring the 
closeness of the bank costs to the minimum costs for the bank’s output that could be 
achieved on the market. To estimate efficiency authors assume that the cost 
function has a composite error term that includes both inefficiencies (deviations from 
the efficient frontier) and random error. The difficulty in estimating efficiency in 
practice is in drawing the line between the two. The key assumption of DFA is that 
cost differences owing to inefficiency are relatively stable and should persist over 
time, while those owing to random error will average out over time and become 
zero. The bank that could achieve that minimum represents efficiency frontier and all 
the other banks are compared to that bank. We apply the DFA method to panel 
data and estimate a regression of trans-log cost function to create statistical 
connections between costs and observed levels of bank data variables (bank 
products and input prices). The residuals of these cross-section regressions are 
assumed to contain random measurement error, temporary variations in costs, and 
persistent but unknown cost differences attributed to inefficiency. Averaging each 
banks' residual across a long enough period of time across separate cross-section 
regressions reduces normally distributed error from trans-log function to minimal levels 
leaving only average inefficiency. We follow De Young (1997) who calculated that 
six years of separate cross-section regressions is needed for random error to 
approach zero. This is the reason why we excluded banks for which the regression 
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One has to be aware of the limits of the DFA approach as the measure derived 
from this method is of a relative nature and therefore is scaled to the most efficient 
bank. Consequently, no easy-to-use-aggregate number can be achieved and used 
for commenting the absolute efficiency of banks, as it was not known what was 
happening with the most efficient bank. Other limit arises from the fact that DFA has 
to be applied on periods and therefore conclusions cannot be drawn separately for 
years. Finally, it should be noted that data-truncating procedure is important for any 
frontier analysis results. The more data is trimmed or winsorized, the higher the 
efficiency scores will result as differences between average bank and most efficient 
bank reduce. 
For the XE calculation, we use standard trans-log cost function with three inputs 
(financial capital, labour and physical capital) and three outputs (investments, loans 












































where subscripts n is the nth input and m denotes the mth output, i is ith bank, C is cost, 
Y is bank product and W is input price. 
For the DFA method, a vector cost function is modified, as the error term is 
decomposed: 
itiititit vuYWC lnln),ln(ln  , (2) 
 
where iuln  is inefficiency and itvln is measurement error. 
To calculate efficiency, we average the residuals from equation (2) for each bank 
over the six years. This average residual, is an estimate of ln(xi) , given that the 
random errors ln(vit) will tend to cancel each other out for each firm separately in the 
averaging. We transform ln( iuˆ ) into a normalized measure of efficiency: 
)ˆlnˆexp(ln min ii uuXE  , (3) 
 
where iuˆ is the average residual from trans-log function for each bank and min 
indicates the minimum for all i. 
This is an estimate of the ratio of costs for the most efficient bank in the sample to 
bank i costs for bank i combination of outputs and input prices. This corresponds with 
the conventional notion of efficiency as the ratio of the minimum resources needed 
for production to the resources actually used, and ranges over (0, 1], with higher 
values indicating greater efficiency. 
On the issue of cost definition, there is no consensus in the literature as authors use 
different definitions ranging from only administrative costs to total costs including 
interest costs and sometimes even loan loss provisions. However, it should be noted 
that using a different cost definition would require a different interpretation and 
therefore the results of different researches cannot be easily compared. Having this 
in mind, we calculate our XE using two definitions of costs: narrow (administrative 
costs) and broad (total costs). However, we do not include loan loss provisions in 
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and not cost management. In addition, besides, loan loss provisions from today result 
from decisions made in the past. 
 
 








LN_OC – Log of 
Administrative cost 
Sum of employee costs, 
depreciation and other 
administrative costs 
847 10.5 1.5 4.0 14.3 
LC_TC – Log of Total 
cost including 
interest cost 
Administrative cost plus cost 
of fees and other non-
interest costs plus interest 
costs 
826 11.5 1.6 5.2 15.5 
LC_Y1 – Log of 
Investments 
Placements in securities 847 13.3 1.8 5.5 18.1 
LN_Y2 – Log of Loans Placements in total loans 822 12.9 1.9 6.3 17.3 
LN_Y3 – Log of Fee 
income 
Fees charged 825 9.5 1.8 3.4 13.9 
Ln_W1 –Log of Price 
of funds 
Interest costs to total 
deposits 
846 -3.0 0.5 -6.0 -1.4 
Ln_W2 – Log of Price 
of labour 
Employee costs to assets 841 -5.6 0.7 -10.4 -3.6 
LN_W3 – Log of Price 
of physical assets 
Administrative cost other 
than employee costs to non-
interest bearing assets 
846 -4.0 0.6 -8.8 -2.5 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
 
The initial sample includes unbalanced panel with 72 banks over 21 years (1994 - 
2014) making 876 observations overall. Out of 72, 27 banks were present on the 
market at the end of 2014 out of which 23 banks were present in the whole sample. 
The data is collected from statistical and supervisory reports gathered by the 
Croatian National Bank. The data set is skewed as the number of banks in the 
sample decreases over time, with the biggest reduction recorded at the beginning 
of the sample in late nineties when the banking crisis occurred. After 2002, the 
decrease in the number of banks is continuous but steady and was mostly the result 
of merger activities. Therefore, after 2002, the structure of the banking system 
remained relatively stable with concentration levels similar to today’s levels and with 
foreign institutions owning around 90% of the banking sector assets. In order to 
compare the results within the banking sector as well as to compare the results with 
earlier research on this topic, the following groups of banks could be recognized: 
small banks (banks with market share lower than 1%), big banks (banks with market 
share higher or equal to 1%), domestic banks (banks whose more than 50% of shares 
is owned by non-government residents), foreign banks (banks whose more than 50% 
of shares is owned by non-residents), and government owned banks (banks whose 
more than 50% of shares is owned by domestic government or agencies). In the 
whole sample, the majority of bank-year observations refer to smaller banks (569 
compared with 278 for bigger bangs). In addition, majority of bank-year 
observations refer to domestic owned banks (486 compared to 256 for foreign-
owned banks and 96 for government owned banks). 
In addition, to remove the outliers from the sample all banks with the implicit 
interest cost of 50% or more were removed from the sample. Further on, banks with 
negative costs of physical assets or with depreciation higher than 40% of physical 
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and our sample after data trimming consists of 848 bank-year observations Table 1). 
Because of DFA method nature, which requires at least six-year periods we average 
only the residuals for banks that were present on the market for at least six years. This 
leads to further reduction of the number of observations and we therefore derive 476 
XE results from 814 residuals. Regarding the model specification, researchers usually 
use panel OLS for calculating efficiency scores via DFA. We use panel OLS and panel 
regression with fixed effects for each bank to ensure the robustness of results. We 
apply Hausman test (1978) for discriminating between random and fixed effects. 
 
Results 
As explained earlier, standard efficiency indicators from financial statements suggest 
that bank cost efficiency in Croatia increased in the1994-2014 sample (Figure 1). In 
addition, standard efficiency indicators would suggest that larger institutions are 
more efficient. However, empirical efficiency indicators show different dynamics and 
different bank ranking. Our results confirm that bank efficiency scores depend 
largely on the definition of efficiency used. Our mean XE amounts to 0.75-0.79 for 
administrative costs and 0.81-0.84 for total costs depending on the model 
specification (Table 2). Therefore, on average, most efficient bank on the market 
could offer the same service with the same input prices as average bank by using 
75-79 percent of its administrative costs and 81-84 percent of its total costs. Our 
results also suggest that the XE differences between banks in Croatia are relatively 
stable over time (Figure 2 and Appendix Table A2). 
 
 
Figure 1 Selected banking sector indicators 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
Note: Market instability index is calculated according to Hymer and Pashigan (1962). It is the 
sum of all changes of market shares in a year.  
 
Compared with other research results using frontier analysis, our XE results are 
similar with results from Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) and Ariss (2010). Kraft and Tirtioglu 
(1998) calculated an average XE for banks in Croatia of around 0.75-0.80 for 1994 
and 1995. Our results for total cost efficiency for the 1994-1999 period are 0.81-0.84. 
Ariss (2010) calculated efficiency for Croatia of 0.83 for 1999-2005 periods, which is 
close to our result of 0.85. The differences between our results and comparable 
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Table 2 XE descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Administrative costs – OLS 476 0.79 0.08 0.48 1 
Administrative costs – F.E. 476 0.75 0.10 0.43 1 
Total costs - OLS 472 0.81 0.09 0.52 1 
Total costs - F.E. 472 0.84 0.09 0.45 1 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
Note: OLS stands for Ordinary least squares and F.E. stands for fixed effects. 
 
The fact that the differences are larger in administrative than total cost efficiency 
could be due to a couple of factors. First, the differences between banks in Croatia 
regarding business strategy are substantial; some banks are more focused on 
corporate, some on natural persons and some are universal in full meaning of the 
word. Therefore, the distribution network that initiates the majority of administrative 
costs is quite different between banking groups. Also, since administrative costs are 
relatively small (some 2.5 percent of total assets), it is possible some banks believe 
that they can afford to be more “comfortable” in managing them.  
 
 
Figure 2 Medial (left) and weighted average (right) bank efficiency 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
 
Even though one should keep in mind that XE is a relative indicator and that by 
using the DFA it can be only calculated for periods and not years, it is still possible to 
show a time dimension of bank efficiency. This can be done by showing the 
regression for six-year periods. Having this in mind, we can conclude that, relative to 
the most efficient bank on the market, cost efficiency was relatively high from the 
1994-1999 to 1997-2002 which could related with the process of market cleansing 
when less efficient banks left the market. After this period, efficiency started to 
decrease from the period 1997-2002 which lasted until 1999-2004 period. After that 
period, efficiency increased and remained stable until 2006-2011 when total costs 
efficiency increased. Therefore, although we see some relative efficiency gains 
during the financial crisis on total costs level, on administrative costs level, the 
efficiency remained unchanged. 
Having more detailed information on bank level allows us to compare the 
efficiencies between banking groups. Our results suggest that bank size does not 
seem to be a determinant of bank efficiency as we see no difference between 
bigger or smaller banks total cost efficiency. Regarding administrative cost 
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mentioning that one of the advantages of XE is the fact that it is not influenced by 
economies of scale and therefore we are able to learn more about cost 
management without it being masked by bank balance sheet size. Therefore, XE 
concept "allows" smaller banks to be more efficient even though all the efficiency 
indicators from financial statements (cost to income, labour to deposits, and assets 
per employee) would suggest that larger banks are more efficient. Differences 
regarding the ownership suggest that domestic banks are more efficient on 
administrative level, while on the total costs level, banks are equally efficient, 
regardless of the ownership structure.  
 
























Admin. costs - F.E. 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.70 0.70 0.77 
Admin. costs - OLS 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.80 
Total costs - F.E. 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 
Total costs - OLS 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.82 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
Note: OLS stands for Ordinary least squares and F.E. stands for fixed effects. 
 
Having conducted a bank-level research allows us to describe the characteristics 
of the most efficient banks. Regarding the administrative costs, our frontier banks are 
banks with rather small average market share of just 0.3% and they are domestically 
owned. Two out of three most efficient banks in managing administrative costs are 
still present today, but even the ones that left the market, did so because they were 
merged with larger bank, not due to bankruptcy. In addition, banks that are most 
efficient in managing administrative costs have average loans to assets ratio of 
around 64%, which is higher, compared with the average bank. On the other hand, 
the ratio of equity to assets of these banks is rather high in the whole sample (around 
21%). Finally, with average profitability of assets (ROA) of around 0.5-1.0 percent 
these banks are recording average profitability. On the other hand, banks that 
represent a group of most efficient bank in total costs management have a rather 
different characteristics. Those banks are usually somewhat bigger compared with 
banks that are most efficient in managing administrative costs and have a market 
share of around 0.7 and 2.1 percent. However, banks most efficient in managing 
total costs did record a couple of defaults, but the incidence was still below 
average. Those banks also have a relatively high loan to asset ratio as well equity to 
asset ratio (Table 4). 
It is interesting to notice that most efficient banks in managing administrative costs 
usually pay a significantly higher price for funds (higher implicit interest rate on 
liabilities) compared with most efficient banks in managing total costs. This should not 
come as a surprise when we acknowledge that liabilities are the most important 
inputs for banks and if they pay higher price for this input, they will be motivated to 
increase the efficiency. As shown in the appendix (Table A2), the correlation 
between administrative and total cost efficiency is only moderate, at around 
0.5.Finally, government owned banks did not show up on efficiency frontier in our 
research. However, to be fair, there are only a few government owned banks in our 
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frontier - OLS 
Admin. 
costs 








Domestic 58.0% 100.0% 100.0% 68.8% 81.3% 
Foreign 30.5% 0.0% 0.0% 31.3% 18.8% 
Government owned 11.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Big 32.8% 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 6.3% 
Small 67.2% 100.0% 100.0% 81.3% 93.8% 
Market share 2.5% 0.3% 0.3% 2.1% 0.7% 
Present today 71.1% 68.8% 68.8% 87.5% 81.3% 
Defaulted 10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 
Merged 14.8% 31.3% 31.3% 6.3% 12.5% 
Equity to assets 18.8% 21.5% 20.5% 22.2% 24.8% 
ROA 0.6% 1.0% 0.5% 1.9% 1.9% 
Loans to assets 59.7% 63.7% 63.1% 66.3% 64.6% 
Price of funds 5.5% 5.7% 5.8% 5.0% 4.9% 
Price of physical assets 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 
Price of labour 2.0% 1.4% 1.5% 1.0% 1.4% 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
 
Although the differences between XE of banks seem rather small at first, a careful 
look at the data offers a different view. To show the impact of potential increase of 
efficiency on bank profitability, we calculate the potential costs savings the following 
way: 
Cost_savings=(1-XE)*Costs, (4) 
where XE is X-efficiency, and costs are administrative or total costs in absolute terms. 
The rationale for this formula is simple; if bank has XE score of 0.85 it means that the 
most efficient bank on the market would be able to offer the same services and pay 
the same input prices while generating only 85% of its costs. Therefore, 15% is the 
potential costs savings for the bank. 
 
 
Figure 3 ROA with cost efficiency equal to most efficient bank 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
 
Our results suggest that if all banks increased their efficiency in managing 
administrative costs to the level of the most efficient bank, costs savings could 
amount to 0.2% of assets on average in last twenty years. If the same simulation is 
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assets on average. In addition, it is worth mentioning that this costs savings would be 
repeated each year and would significantly increase banks ROA and capital levels. 
Therefore, bank cost efficiency should be monitored more carefully; as costs saved 
are potential earnings and potential earnings are potential capital (Figure 3).  
 
Conclusions 
Although domestic and smaller banks better results in administrative costs 
management seems surprising, one should be aware of the fact that administrative 
costs represent a relatively small portion of total costs. Therefore, smaller and 
domestic banks that pay higher interest cost perhaps find it necessary to keep every 
manageable cost under control. Regarding total costs efficiency, we find no 
significant differences between banks regarding size or ownership from 1994-2014. 
Since our measure is a relative one, better than expected cost management of 
smaller and domestic banks could result from specific circumstances of bigger and 
foreign owned banks. Managing larger institutions is harder as they are involved in 
operations that are more complicated. In addition, banks with more market power 
have a higher franchise value, which they protect via more stringent credit risk 
management or with strategically focused activities that can appear as cost 
inefficiency. 
Our results on bank efficiency in Croatia are comparable to other research on the 
matter, especially ones using trans-log cost functions and frontier analysis (DFA or 
SFA). Average and medial bank is relatively close to the most efficient bank, 
however, although it may seem that differences in cost efficiencies are small and 
that the potential earnings on costs are small, should all banks increase their 
efficiency to the level of most efficient bank, bank ROA could be increased 
noticeably. Moreover, even though it is not realistic to expect that all banks increase 
their efficiency to the frontier, the result show that further work on the issues of bank 
efficiency could be beneficial. This is especially obvious when we consider the fact 
that cost savings refer to each year, so on cumulative level significant gains for 
earnings could be achieved. By increasing the ROA, those savings could increase 
capital adequacy (providing that the earnings be retained) or owners' welfare 
(providing that the dividends be distributed). 
While commenting on the results of all efficiency research based on frontier 
analysis, one has to have in mind the specificity of efficiency measure. XE shows the 
relative ability of a management to keep the costs, given prices and quantities of 
inputs, relatively close to the best cost-managing bank on the market. Therefore, the 
fact that smaller banks usually pay higher price for input as well as that they benefit 
less from the economies of scale plays no technical role with this measure. Higher 
than expected average XE of smaller banks could be a result of the fact that they 
think twice before spending money while bigger banks can act strategically or enjoy 
the “quiet life” of larger institution. Combined with better credit-risk management, 
they perhaps do not feel the pressure to worry about administrative costs that much. 
Our results also suggest that depending on the scope of cost definition, efficiency 
can differ although we derive comparable results by using different model 
specification (panel OLS or panel with effects). This is important as different authors 
use different definition of cost as well as model specification, which makes their result 
less comparable. It is also worth mentioning that data truncation can play an 
important role in efficiency scores. In our research, we removed the banks that had 
a “suspicious” data in the beginning and therefore no further trimming was needed 
when we averaged the residuals. However, some authors run the regression first, and 
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to different results as more rigorous truncating rules will reduce the differences 
between observed banks and efficiency scores will be closer to one. 
To conclude, our results are opposite to the general impression that larger and 
foreign owned banks are more efficient or that banks "increased their efficiency 
after the financial crisis started", however they are still comparable with some earlier 
research based on the similar techniques. Looking at the average and weighted 
average scores, relative efficiency did increase after 2005-2010 but nothing to 
suggest some major strategic changes in the cost management practices. Going 
further, our research could serve as a motivation for other bank level research on 
Croatian banking sector. Therefore, cost inefficiencies are making the life of bank 
managers more comfortable, but in the same time, owners' welfare could be 
suffering which opens the question of agency theory in Croatian banking sector. In 
addition, it should be kept in mind that XE is only one of the empirically based 
efficiency of the individual bank. Only by calculating scale and scope efficiency as 
well as XE, one can have a clear picture about cost efficiency of banks. 
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Table A1 Trans-log function results 
  
  
Administrative costs Total costs 
OLS F.E. OLS F.E. 
ln(y1) 0.39 *** 0.36 *** 0.98 *** 0.89 *** 
ln(y2) 0.41 *** 0.31 *** 0.46 *** 0.13   
ln(y3) 0.06   0.01   -0.22 * 0.09   
ln(w1) -0.14   -0.08   0.05   0.27 * 
ln(w2) 0.67 *** 0.37 *** 0.71 *** 0.49 *** 
ln(w3) 0.21   0.17   0.37   0.57 ** 
ln_y1*ln_y1/2 0.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.23 *** 0.16 *** 
ln_y2*ln_y2/2 0.19 *** 0.17 *** 0.18 *** 0.16 *** 
ln_y3*ln_y3/2 -0.02 * -0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.06 *** 
ln_w1*ln_w1/2 0.07 *** 0.04   0.08 ** 0.12 *** 
ln_w2*ln_w2/2 0.09 *** 0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 
ln_w3*ln_w3/2 0.23 *** 0.26 *** 0.29 *** 0.25 *** 
ln_y1*ln_y2/2 -0.36 *** -0.32 *** -0.37 *** -0.25 *** 
ln_y1*ln_y3/2 0.02   0.07 *** -0.12 *** -0.06 * 
ln_y2*ln_y3/2 -0.02   0.01   -0.02   -0.08 *** 
ln_w1*ln_w2/2 0.02   0.02   0.08 ** 0.04   
ln_w1*ln_w3/2 -0.04   -0.06   -0.10   0.01   
ln_w2*ln_w3/2 -0.19 *** -0.22 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** 
ln_y1*ln_w1/2 -0.06   -0.09 ** 0.06   0.11 ** 
ln_y1*ln_w2 -0.07 *** -0.02   -0.09 *** -0.05 ** 
ln_y1*ln_w3 0.17 *** 0.12 *** 0.23 *** 0.17 *** 
ln_y2*ln_w1 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.03   0.01   
ln_y2*ln_w2 0.01   -0.01   0.02   0.00   
ln_y2*ln_w3 -0.02   -0.01   -0.08 *** -0.07 ** 
ln_y3*ln_w1 -0.01   0.01   -0.02   -0.03 ** 
ln_y3*ln_w2 0.06 *** 0.02 ** 0.04 *** 0.03 * 
ln_y3*ln_w3 -0.13 *** -0.06 *** -0.17 *** -0.10 *** 
_cons 2.74 *** 3.05 *** 0.83   2.12 *** 
R-square 0.99   0.99   0.98   0.98   
N. of obs. 814   814   812   812   
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data, 








Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS) Vol. 1, No. 1-2, 2015 
Table A2 XE scores correlates 
  
Admin. 
costs - F.E 
Admin. 
costs - OLS 
Total costs - 
F.E. 
Total costs - 
OLS 
Admin. costs - F.E 1.00       
Admin costs - OLS 0.90 1.00     
Total costs - F.E. 0.53 0.50 1.00   
Total costs - OLS 0.46 0.48 0.87 1.00 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
Note: OLS stands for Ordinary least squares and F.E. stands for fixed effects. 
 


























       1994-1999 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.70 0.78 0.75
1995-2000 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.77 0.77 
1996-2001 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.81 
1997-2002 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.82 
1998-2003 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.84 
1999-2004 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.71 0.78 
2000-2005 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.77 0.77 0.81 
2001-2006 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.79 0.78 0.82 
2002-2007 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.79 0.82 
2003-2008 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.82 
2004-2009 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.82 
2005-2010 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.81 
2006-2011 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.78 
2007-2012 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.77 
2008-2013 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.77 
2009-2014 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 
F.E. 
       1994-1999 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.67 0.72 0.75
1995-2000 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.69 0.74 0.77 
1996-2001 0.77 0.72 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.73 0.80 
1997-2002 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.80 
1998-2003 0.79 0.74 0.80 0.83 0.73 0.73 0.82 
1999-2004 0.75 0.69 0.74 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.78 
2000-2005 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.82 0.71 0.69 0.80 
2001-2006 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.81 0.70 0.69 0.78 
2002-2007 0.74 0.70 0.73 0.79 0.69 0.68 0.77 
2003-2008 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.68 0.68 0.77 
2004-2009 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.76 
2005-2010 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.70 0.77 
2006-2011 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.75 
2007-2012 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.69 0.69 0.74 
2008-2013 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.70 0.69 0.75 
2009-2014 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.69 0.75 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
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       1994-1999 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.89 0.79 0.80
1995-2000 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 
1996-2001 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.93 0.88 0.89 
1997-2002 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.85 
1998-2003 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.77 
1999-2004 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 
2000-2005 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.77 
2001-2006 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.80 
2002-2007 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.80 
2003-2008 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.81 
2004-2009 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.81 
2005-2010 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 
2006-2011 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.81 
2007-2012 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.84 
2008-2013 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.87 
2009-2014 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.87 
F.E. 
       1994-1999 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.89 0.82 0.83 
1995-2000 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.87 
1996-2001 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.86 0.86 
1997-2002 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.83 
1998-2003 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.79 
1999-2004 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.79 
2000-2005 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.85 
2001-2006 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.87 
2002-2007 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
2003-2008 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 
2004-2009 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
2005-2010 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 
2006-2011 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.83 
2007-2012 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.88 
2008-2013 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.89 
2009-2014 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.88 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
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Figure A1 Averaged residuals histograms 





Figure A2 XE histograms 
Source: Authors' calculation based on CNB data. 
